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Abstract  
 
The goal of this study is to test the implication of optimal seigniorage theory that in the long 
run higher tax rates are associated with higher inflation rates and higher nominal interest rates. 
For this purpose, we examine the long run relationship between nominal interest rates, 
inflation and tax revenue using time series dataset for Turkish Economy for the period 1980-
2011. We estimate the Mankiw’s (1987) optimal seigniorage model for Turkish Economy 
with the cointegration and vector error correction methods (VECM). According to 
econometric result, in long run there is a causality relationship from inflation and tax revenue 
to nominal interest rates.  However, in short run we could not find any evidence that support a 
causality from inflation and tax revenue to nominal interest rates.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There are two sources for governments to raises their revenues: The first source of revenue is the tax 
put on output, and the second source is seigniorage. Seigniorage is also known as printing new money 
and defined as the value of real resources acquired by the government through its power of 
sovereignty on its monopoly of printing money (Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch, 1994). Both sources of 
revenue cause deadweight social losses (Mankiw, 1987: 327-328), moreover inflation also brings 
some other social costs, such as reducing purchasing power of consumers, shoeleather costs, menu 
costs, variability in relative prices, imperfect indexation in the tax code and inconvenience. These 
costs are not very high for the moderate inflation commonly seen in industrial or developed countries 
(Foote, 2010: 58), but for developing countries, these costs can cause drastic social results.  
 
We know that a developing country has fewer options to finance its increasing public sector deficits 
compared with developed countries. These countries can finance their deficits with three different 
ways: Borrowing from banking sector, both state-owned and commercial bank, including the central 
bank, from non-bank national alternatives and from the international financial markets. As the 
financial system, consisted of banking sector, non-bank financial institutions and the financial markets, 
is poor and shallow in developing countries, the financing deficit by the way one is relatively limited. 
After liberalizaiton of the financial markets by the 1980’s, borrowing from the international financial 
markets has become the most common way of financing deficits for developing countries (Samimi et 
al., 2012: 82-83). But when these countries lose their credibilities as a result of debt crises, 
governments were forced to borrow from the central bank and commercial banking system. This 
requirement has forced central banks to print money. For a developing country, domestic borrowing 
possibilities, to a great extent,  may increase inflation. In this case it is a question whether the 
govenmnets could collect maximum seigniorage revenue thanks to its monopoly on printing money 
(Korap, 2006: 5). 
 
Inflation tax is also one of the drastic results of high inflation. Inflation tax is a term which refers to 
the reduction in the real value of financial stocks in the hands of the people due to the effects of 
inflation. In other words, inflation tax has a welfare cost effect (Cooley and Hansen, 1989: 742). The 
real financial loss can be expressed as loss of purchasing power of money holder. Seignoirage revenue 
creates inflation and this inflation cause financial losses. There should be positive correlation between 
printing money, namely seigniorage revenue, and inflation tax.  According to optimal seignoraige 
theory, nominal interest rates and inflation are determined due to government’s necessity to finance its 
budget deficit. If marginal cost of the tax is increasing with income, then a positive relationship will 
occur between inflation and nominal interest rates and taxes (Aslan, 2003: 125). The theory indicates 
that that nominal interest rates and inflation are random walks, but suggest that nominal interest rates 
and inflation move together with tax rates. Mankiv tested this theory for the United States of America 
(USA) for the period 1952-1985, and provided some support for the theory (Mankiw, 1987: 327).  
 
Many economist including Bailey (1956), Cagan (1956), Friedman (1971), Phelps (1973, 1972), Klein 
and Neumann (1990) and Marty (1967) analyze seigniorage revenue as a source of income to the 
government. In this point there are two different approaches trying to explain the relationship between 
seignoraige, nominal interest rates and inflation (Gürbüz et al, 2009: 55-56): The first approach 
belongs to monetarists. According to the monetarist theory an increase in the monetary base will 
increase monetary inflation. The rise in inflation reduces real money balances through a rising in the 
nominal interest rates. This affects the readjustment of cash between economic agents, and leads a rise 
in stocks and reduction of private consumption. According to the second approach developed by 
Phelps (1973), seigniorage revenue is equal to the multiplication of nominal interest rates and real 
money balances. Then, Phelps suggests that the income obtained by government depends on private 
sector’s nominal interest rate’s losses. 
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In this paper we investigate the relationship between real seigniorage revenue and inflation tax for 
Turkish Economy in a long time period 1980-2012. According to vector error correction (VECM) 
result of the study inflation and tax revenue has long run causality on interest rates. In long run 
inflation and tax revenue increases nominal interest rates positively and significantly. Nut in short run 
there is not causality between variables.  
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section two gives a brief introduction on Turkish Economy, 
while section three introduces seigniorage revenue, inflation tax and Mankiw’s (1987) optimal 
seigniorage model. Section four estimates the empiric model and analyzes whether the seigniorage 
maximizing inflation value in Turkish Economy is existed. The final section concludes the study. 
 
2. Turkish Economy, Inflation Tax and Seigniorage Revenue 
Turkish economy lived a chronic high inflationary problem between 1978 and 2002. During this time 
period Turkish economy has experienced two digits and sometimes three digits inflationary years as in 
1982 and 1994. In Table 1 inflation experience and narrow (M1) and broad money (M2) growth rate 
of Turkish Economy is listed. While Table 2 shows inflation experience of some selected developing 
countries with narrow money M1 growth rate. From table 1, it is seen that Turkish experience was 
neither hyperinflation of the two digits price increases in a monthly time period nor a moderate 
inflation of the single digit in an annual time period; however Turkish experience constituted a 
privileged position in the world economy (Korap, 2006: 2). 2002 is the turning point in Turkish 
experience of inflation, because CBRT (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey) changed its monetary 
policy strategy from exchange rate anchor and money targeting regimes to the explicitly inflation 
targeting  regime. Namely, a tradeoff between intermediate targeting regimes was happened in 2002. 
After that a drastic decline in inflationary process of Turkish Economy has seen, and annual inflation 
rate has begun to cycle between 5% and 10%.  It is also clear that there is a parallel movement 
between M2 growth rate and inflation rate in Turkey. But M1 is not correlated with inflation at the 
same time period.   
 
Table 1. Money Stock and inflation in Turkey (% of GNP) 
Time Period   (%) M1/GNP (%) M2/GNP (%) 
1970-1979 24,27 17,04 21,16 
1980-1989 52,14 11,02 22,07 
1990-1999 79,10 6,19 18,90 
2000-2012 19,25 6,75 2,34 
Notes:   is the annual percentage change of the consumer price index.  
Source: Writer’s calculation from CBRT dataset 
 
While in table 2 inflation rates in selected developing countries fluctuate between 437 % and 2,7 %.  
In these countries generally there is a positive correlation between M1 growth rate and inflation rate. 
Percentage change of narrow money base and inflation rate moves almost in the same scale in 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. If money growth rate is two-digits, inflation is also two digits and vice 
versa.  
Table 2. Inflation and Money Growth Rate in Selected Developing Countries 
  Yearly growth rate  1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 
Argentina 
Inflation Rate 21,2 119,5 437,6 
M1 growth rate 23,2 108,6 400,4 
Brazil 
Inflation Rate 43,5 35,3 337,1 
M1 growth rate 48 43,5 339,8 
Chili 
Inflation Rate 28,9 130,3 20,3 
M1 growth rate 41 147 19,5 
Israel Inflation Rate 5,6 41,6 91,2 
M1 growth rate 3,7 48,9 99,6 
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Mexico Inflation Rate 2,7 16,5 65,1 
M1 growth rate 12 24,4 58,4 
Uruguay Inflation Rate 44 62 60 
M1 growth rate 43 59 55,9 
Source: Carlos A. Vegh. (1992). Stopping High Inflation, IMF Staff Papers, Vol.39, No.3, 
p.633. 
 
In graph 2 we present inflation (INF), inflation tax (INFTX) and seigniorage (SEIG) revenue of 
Turkish Economy between 1981 and 2011. Inflation tax is obtained following Bailey (1956), i.e. 
multiplying annual change in consumer price index (CPI) with the previous year’s monetary base, 
while seigniorage revenue is calculated following Klein and Neumann (1990) and is equal to the 
change in monetary base. Both INFTX and SEIG is smoothed by gross national product (GNP), i.e. 
calculated as a share of GNP. The reference inflation used in this paper is the yearly change in CPI 
index.  All the calculations based on the yearly data from 1981 to 2011, obtained from electronic data 
service of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. It is seen in Graph 2 that Inflation tax and 
seigniorage revenue fluctuate in the range of 1.55 and 3.95 between 1981 and 1989.  Along the whole 
1990s and 2000, except during and pre-1994 crisis, both inflation tax and the seigniorage revenue are 
sticky around 1-1.5 % GNP.  Graph 2 also says that during high and volatile inflation periods, due to 
losses in real money balances, i.e. erosion of real demand for money, taxation base reduces and thus 
high and fluctuating inflation does not require larger seigniorage revenue (Korap, 2006: 7). 
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 Graph 2.  Inflation, Inflation Tax and Seigniorage Revenue as Share of GNP 
 
 
Source: CBRT 
 
 
3. Mankiw’s (1987) Optimal Seignoriaga Model  
 
Inflationist financing method of budget deficit is denoted by special terms inflation tax and 
seigniorage (Aslan, 2003: 127). Seigniorage is defined as real revenue raised from monopoly power of 
government on printing money and demonstrated with 
  
 
  rate of change in monetary base to the 
consumer price index (Klein and Neumann, 1990: 206). On the other hand inflation tax is a result of 
inflation and indicates the real capital losses of money holder, and defined as multiplication of 
inflation rate and real value of the (outside) quantity of Money (Phelps, 1973;  Bailey, 1956):   
 
 
 . 
There is also growth seigniorage in developing countries, having positive growth rate, as a result of 
increasing demand for money (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1987:  647). Following Tobin (1956), Marty 
(1967) proposed to measure inflation tax with an alternative way by the rate of growth of money 
supply times real balances (Phelps, 1973: 68; Marty, 1967; 71). In this case real seigniorage revenue is 
equal to the multiplication of sum of inflation and growth rate and real Money balances: (  
  (
 
 
)                                In his “inflation policy book”, Phelps (1972) equals inflation 
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tax to the multiplication of nominal interest rates and real balances, 
(     (
 
 
)                                                   This definition expresses that the 
income obtained by the government is then equivalent to the loss of the interest rate of the private 
sector (Gürbüz et al., 2009: 56). In this sense, seigniorage is a type of interest-free credit, paid by 
private sector due to holding liquid balance, transferred to the government (Aslan, 2003: 127-128).   
 
Given exogenous expenditure and an intertemporal budget constraint, when governemnet expenditure 
is financed by monetary and fiscal policy, nominal interest rates and inflation move together with tax 
rates put on output over the time (Mankiw, 1987: 327). According to Mankiw, if fiscal policy 
dominates monetary policy then government should implies monetary and fiscal policies targeting 
minimize social costs depending on tax and seigniorage revenue.  
 
Mankiw’s approach can be summarized as follows within the framework of intertemporal 
analyzes.The optimal intertemporal monetary and fiscal policy of a government should be examined 
under the following budget constraint in the present value (Mankiw, 1987: 328): 
 
∫                   
 
 
∫             
 
 
                                                      
 
Where G(t) = real expenditure at time t, T( t ) = real revenue at time t, B(t) = real government debt at 
time r,   = real discount rate (assumed constant over time). Expenditure is taken to be exogenous, and 
future expenditure is a random variable. The government takes into consideration two different 
financing way financing budget deficits to minimize social losses:  Tax on output and seigniorage. If 
level of output and tax rate on output is denoted by      and      respectively, then revenue collected 
by government is         , and social losses caused by taxes will be equal to f( )Y.  Here,       
and      .  Suppose that M(t), P(t) and   in order show exogenous money supply, price level at time 
t and a constant respectively, then demand for money can be expressed within quantity equation as 
follows: 
 
    
    
                                                                                    
Suppose that the inflation rate and the growth rate of output are shown by    
 ̇
 
        
 ̇
 
   in order.  
The real seigniorage revenue equals to: 
 
 ̇
 
 
 ̇
 
  
 
 
                                                                   
 
Adding the sum of the receipts from direct taxation and seigniorage, we find a formulation for total 
government revenue as below: 
 
                                                                               
 
Assume that       indicates social cost of inflation, where   >0 and         Examples to the direct 
and indirect costs of inflation are menu cost and inefficient functioning of markets respectively. To 
overcome these costs, the government targets to minimize the expected present value of the social 
costs under the budget constraint:  
 
  ∫  
   [         ]                                                               
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For this purpose, the government has two choices: Inflation rate   1 and tax rate  . Mankiw then 
examines the first- order condition of the equation (5) for an optimum as below:  
  
      
 [      ]    [    ]                                                    
 
      
 [      ]    [    ]                                                    
 
  [    ]     [    ]                                                    
 
Under budget constraint the optimal monetary and fiscal policy satisfies these three equations.   
The intertemporal first-order conditions (6) and (7) in order equates marginal social cost of taxation 
today and in the future, and the marginal social cost of inflation today and in the future. While, the 
static first-order condition (8) equates the marginal social costs of raising revenues through direct 
taxation and through seigniorage. According to first- order condition (8), an increase in the 
government revenue requirement increases the use of both direct taxation and seigniorage. This usage 
leads a parallel movement between level of taxation and inflation and nominal interest rates (Mankiv, 
1987: 329-331). Mankiv test his optimal seigniorage theory for USA for a long time period 1952 and 
1985. Findings are in the direction that there is a positive relationship between nominal interest rates 
and level of direct taxation. He also find a log-run relationship between inflation rate and level of 
direct taxation. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this part, optimal seigniorage theory is tested for Turkish Economy with yearly data 
between 1980- 2012. The fundamental property of the optimal seignoıriage theory is that 
inflation rate and nominal interest rates are determined by revenue requirement of the 
government. If we could collect reliable estimates for marginal social cost of inflation, 
marginal social cost of direct taxation and interest elasticity of money demand, then equation 
(8) could be estimated to find out relationship between level of direct taxation, inflation and 
nominal interest rates at any point in time. Because we do not know these social costs, we 
prefer linear approximation to equation (8) for Turkish Economy, as Mankiw did for USA 
with tiem series data (Mankiw, 1987: 332).  
 
The goal of this study is to test the implication of optimal seigniorage theory that in the long 
run higher tax rates are associated with higher inflation rates and higher nominal interest rates. 
Namely, a cointegration relationship between nominal interest rates, inflation and taxes is 
examined. We will decide whether there is a long-run equilibrium point for these variables. If 
they move together there should be an equilibrium point which nominal interest rates, 
inflation and taxes are converging to.  
 
Data used in this paper obtained from statistics of ministry of finance, data delivery system of 
the undersecretariat of treasury and Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. Definitions and 
some basic descriptive statistics of the variables we employed in the model are presented in 
table 3 with in level and in first differences. The choice of variables used in the model is 
based on previous studies in the related empirical literature. Table 3 indicates that maximum 
volatility happens in INT and INF variables, corresponding in order to the inflation and 
compound interest rates of treasury bills during the time period considered. When we look at 
the first differences, we see that the mean of first differences given in the table 3 are differen 
but near zero. Hence, these findings could be accepted as the evidence of linear deterministic 
trend in levels of series (Güloğlu and Ivrendi, 2010).  
                                                 
1
 Here inflation is used in the sense of money stock, but given output, this is equivalent to choosing the rate of 
inflation (Mankiw, 1987: 330)  
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 Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Definition of Series in Level   
Variables Def. Mean S. Dev Min. Val. Max. Val. Obs. 
INF Percentage change of CPI 44.3 29.3 5.5 106.2 32 
TAX Ratio of total tax revenue to the GNP 0.16 0.05 0.10 0.24 32 
INT 
Compound interest rates held in 
Treasury bills auctions  50.8 59.9 6.24 342.2 32 
dINF First difference of INF -1.17 13.48 -19.97 39.87 31 
dTAX First difference of TAX 0.002 0.01 -0.02 0.04 31 
dINT First difference of INT -0.40 68.72 -265.86 258.17 31 
Source: CBRT electronic data service. 
 
In the next section, we will firstly investigate stationarity and level of integration of time 
series we employ in the model. The determination of the degree of integration of series and 
the choice of appropriate cointegration analysis I(1) or I(2) is important to make appropriate 
econometric analysis (Güloğlu and İvrendi, 2010: 9). There are also some potential problems 
of using non-stationary data. Because non-stationary time series can cause spurious (non-
sense) regression results, as noted by Granger and Newbold (1974).  Assume that we have a 
single equation as follow: 
 
Yt=1+ 2Xt+ut                                                              (9) 
 
Where Yt ~I(1) and Xt~I(1). If we make unit root test for residuals and decide that residuals 
series ut is stationary, then it ıs concluded that, however, Yt and Xt are individually non-
stationary, their some linear combination is stationary. In other words, linear combination 
delete stochastic trend in series Xt and Yt. In this case, established regression line is 
significant and X and Y is cointegrated. They move together in long run, and converge to an 
equilibrium point over time (Engle and Granger, 1987: 251-276). 
 
4.1. Unit Root Tests  
 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) unit root 
tests are employed to determine whether the variables are stationary. The unit root tests also 
turn out to be important in the determination of the degree of integration of series and the 
choice of appropriate cointegration analysis I(1) or I(2). ADF and KPSS unit root tests results 
for first differences of the series are presented in table 4 and table 5. The tables suggest that 
all of the series are I(1). Also this result can be seen from the graphs of series in first 
difference illustrated in figure 1 to figure 3. The graphical analyses of the differenced series 
indicate show that the series are stationary with mean near zero. 
 
Table 4: ADF Test Results 
 (No intercept no trend)     ( Intercept) t ( Intercept and Trend) 
INF -0.891 -0.897 -1.486 
TAX -0.879 -0.403 -1.664 
INT -2.594 -3.68* -3.69* 
dINF  -5.953*** -5.855*** -6.164*** 
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dTAX -5.489*** -5.768*** -5.616*** 
dINT -8.923*** -8.770*** -8.698*** 
Note: Lag lengths are selected automatically according to Akaike Info Criterion.  
The critical values of test statistics (, , t ) are tabulated in Fuller (1976) and MacKinnon (1996). 
*: Test statistics are significant at 10 % level of significance. 
**: Test statistics are significant at 5% level of significance.  
***: Test statistics are significant at 1% level of significance 
 
.                
                                     Table 5: KPSS Unit Roots Test Results 
  (Intercept) t (Intercept and Trend) 
INF 0.208 0.207 
TAX 0.540 0.208 
INT 0.354 0.366 
dINF  0.244*** 0.106*** 
dTAX 0.102*** 0.148** 
dINT 0.172* 0.180* 
 *: The null hypothesis of stationarity is not rejected at 10 % level of significance 
 **: The null hypothesis of stationarity is not rejected at 5 % level of significance 
***: The null hypothesis of stationarity is not rejected at 1 % level of significance 
Critical values are taken from Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992) Table 1. .  
 
As a result, we use I(1) of the variables to determine the number of cointegration vector by 
using Johansen analysis.           
 
4.2. Cointegration Analyzes  
 
In this part we are examining whether the variables are cointegrated with each other. We 
know from Engle Granger (1987) that non-statitonary time series could make a linear 
combination converging to a long run equilibrium point over time. If one or more linear 
combination of individually non-stationary series is stationary then these series may be 
cointegrated.  This means that these series cannot move too far away from each other (Dickey, 
Jansen and Thorton, 1991: 58). We conclude from unit root tests that a VAR- based  
cointegration relationship developed by Johansen (1995) should be estimated in order to 
capture the long-term relationships between variables. For this purpose, we estimate a k-lag 
Vector Error Correction Model by Johansen Method. But firstly, we determine lag length of 
unrestricted VAR model considering six different lag selection criterions including likelihood 
Ratio (LR), Final Prediction Error Criterion (FPE), Akaike information criterion (AIC), 
Schwarz information criterion (SC) and Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ).  VAR lag 
order selection criteria results are shown in table 6. The maximum lag number selected is 6. 
Besides endogenous variables we also add three dummy variables (D94, D01 and D08) in 
VAR, to account for the effects of the two domestic and one global financial crisis ooccurred 
in 1994, 2001 and 2008. The dummy variables D94, D01 and D08 are unity for year 1994, 
2001 and 2008 and zero otherwise. According to table 6, all the lag selection criterions 
suggest 2 lag orders.  
 
Table 6: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
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 Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 NA   214.1282  13.87282  14.45348  14.04003 
1  100.2688  2.259201  9.287821  10.30398  9.580437 
2  26.26588*  1.777092*  1.963511*  5.41516*  2.381534 
3  9.361682  2.050114  8.935689  10.82283  9.479119 
4  9.474528  2.181165  8.680544  11.00318  9.349381 
5  7.084435  2.842831  8.360790  11.11892  9.155033 
6   21.30849   2.01561*   8.975976*   10.169605   9.895626* 
            
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion,  
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
 FPE: Final prediction error  
 AIC: Akaike information criterion  
 SC: Schwarz information criterion  
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
 
In order to determine the cointegration rank, we employ Johansen Test method. There are two 
test statistics for the number of cointegrating vectors: The trace and maximum eigenvalue 
statistics. In the trace test, the null hypothesis is that the number of cointegrating vectors is 
less than or equal to r , where r is 0, 1 or 2.  In each case the alternative hypothesis is tested 
against general alternative. In the case of the maximum eigenvalue test, the null hypothesis 
r=0 is tested against the alternative that r=1, and r=1 is tested against the alternative r=2, etc. 
The critical values for these tests are obtained from Johansen and Juselius (1990). Table 7 
presents the results of Johansen Cointegration Test using the maximum eigenvalue and the 
trace tests. We cannot reject the hypothesis that r    while the hypothesis r=0 and r=1 can be 
rejected for the trace test meaning that there is one cointegrating vector. For the maximum 
eigenvalue test, the hypothesis r=0 is rejected in favor of the r=1. Hence, both trace and max-
eigen statistics suggest that there exists a unique cointegration relation (r=1) among three 
variables. Consequently, these two tests indicate that inflation is cointegrated with taxes and 
nominal interest rates.  
 
Table 7: Johansen Cointegration Test and Cointegrating Vectors for INT 
 
Test Statistics 
 
Max- Eigenvalue statistics Trace statistics 
H0 λmax CV (95%) Prob
β
. H0 Trace CV(95%) Prob
β
.  
r=0*  31.117  25.823  0.009 r=0 62.216      42.915  0.0002 
r=1*  22.643  19.387  0.016 r1  31.098  25.872  0.0102 
r=2  8.4551  12.517  0.216 r2  8.4551  12.517  0.2167 
Normalized Cointegrating Vector 
    
TAX INT INF TREND 
3104.502 (528. 222) 1.000000 -3.098777(0.485) 10.5387 (2.507) 
Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients 
    
INF INT TAX TREND(82) 
 0.058259 -0.018829  64.34726 -0.198423 
 0.098995 -0.043027  1.520516  0.153569 
-0.000792  0.023878  4.269811  0.035573 
    
Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients. 
    
D(INF) -7.406304 -2.958467 -4.048178 
D(INT) -9.116669  11.17821 -27.54609 
D(TAX) -0.005784  0.006141  0.001574 
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Critical values are tabulated from Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level 
β shows MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
CV denotes critical values 
 
Table 7 reports one cointegrating vector linking inflation, tax and nominal interest rates. But a 
cointegrating vector barely represents a long run relationship between endogenous variables. 
Because they are interpreted that there is one linear combination for which the variance is 
bounded (Dickey, Jansen and Thorton, 1991: 76). Structural short and long-run relationships 
are indicated in VECM estimation.  A VECM model with our variables is simply stated as 
follow:  
 
                                                                   
 
Where; INT, INF and TAX are at the first differenced variables.    is intercept,    and    are 
short run coefficient and         is the one period lag residual of below model:  
 
                                                                               
 
        shows the adaptation rate to the long run equilibrium, and is also known as 
equilibrium error term of one period lag. ECT(-1) is an error correction term and leads 
variables INT, INF and TAX of the system to converge or to back to the long run equilibrium 
point. It corrects disequilibrium. Hence, the sign of    should be negative. Significant and 
negative    coefficient shows what rate it corrects the previous period disequilibrium of the 
system. Hence, it means that there exists a long run equilibrium relationship among variables 
INT, TAX and INF stated in model 11.  
 
VECM estimation result with two lagged is reported in Table 8. The coefficient of error 
correction term (ECT (-1)) of the model 1 has been -0.31 meaning that system corrects its 
previous period disequilibrium at a speed of approximately 31 percent yearly. In other saying, 
almost 31% of deviation from long run equilibrium is smoothed in one year. Moreover the 
sign of ECT(-1) coefficient, significant and negative, as it is expected, indicates that there 
existed a long run causality from INF and TAX to INT. Error correction term of the model 2 
and 3 is insignificant. This result indicates that in long run tax revenue and nominal interest 
rates cause inflation. However we could not find any evidence that in long run inflation and 
tax revenue cause nominal interest rates.  
 
According to estimation result of cointegration equation (long-run relationship) on the top of 
table 8 there is a strong and significant long run relationship between treasury bill rate and 
inflation. It implies that an increase in consumer price index is associated with a 2.51 
percentage increase in the nominal interest rate (treasury bill rate). Direction of the 
relationship is positive (In a cointegration model like the ax+by+cz=0, signs are reversed to 
find relationship). The relationship between direct taxation and nominal interest rate is also 
significant but the coefficient on TAX appears very large. It implies that an increase in 
government revenue of 1 percent of GNP is associated with a 42.61 percentage point increase 
in the nominal interest rate.   
 
These results supports the optimal seigniorage theory suggesting in the long run higher tax 
rates are associated with higher inflation rates and higher nominal interest rates in Turkey. 
Our findings are in line with study of Mankiw (1987) on American Economy.  However, 
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these estimation results are not consistent with the empirical study of Aslan (2003) testing 
optimal seignoraige theory for Turkish Economy. The linear trend variable is significant and 
negatively related to the inflation as it is predicted from unit root tests and figure 1 to 3.  
 
 
 
Table 8. VECM Estimation Results 
    
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1    
    
INT(-1)  1.000000 
 
 
  
    
INF(-1) -2.515095   
  (0.03051)   
 [-32.3155]   
TAX(-1) -42.6117   
  (66.8406)   
 [-5.06596]   
TREND  2.140301   
  (0.36373)   
 [ 5.88436]   
C  28.90401   
    
 Model1  Model2  Model3 
Error Correction: D(INT) D(TAX) D(INF) 
ECT(-1) 
-0.316337 -4.32E-05  -0.013748 
  (0.55628)  (0.00011)  (0.10235) 
 [-3.15521] [-0.39565] [ 1.06555] 
    
D(INF(-1)) -0.499130  4.03E-05 -0.199339 
  (0.46037)  (9.0E-05)  (0.08470) 
 [-1.08420] [ 0.44621] [-2.35345] 
    
D(INF(-2)) -0.282119  3.71E-06 -0.103646 
  (0.29943)  (5.9E-05)  (0.05509) 
 [-0.94219] [ 0.06312] [-1.88138] 
    
D(INT(-1))  701.4302  0.137932  357.7651 
  (1206.70)  (0.23691)  (222.015) 
 [ 0.58128] [ 0.58221] [ 1.61145] 
    
D(INT(-2)) -355.1551  0.096274  169.3505 
  (1077.27)  (0.21150)  (198.201) 
 [-0.32968] [ 0.45520] [ 0.85444] 
    
D(TAX(-1)) -0.352392 -0.000449  0.041410 
  (1.26205)  (0.00025)  (0.23220) 
 [-0.27922] [-1.81092] [ 0.17834] 
    
D(TAX(-2))  0.606579  5.32E-05 -0.097041 
  (1.23043)  (0.00024)  (0.22638) 
 [ 0.49298] [ 0.22041] [-0.42866] 
    
C -1.946451  0.001924 -3.000102 
  (14.1319)  (0.00277)  (2.60005) 
 [-0.13773] [ 0.69345] [-1.15386] 
    
D94  44.97880  275.8908  0.003295 
  (12.8101)  (11.4141)  (0.01479) 
 [ 3.51120] [ 24.1710] [ 0.22272] 
    
D01  9.797895  34.76976 -0.002383 
  (16.5680)  (14.7625)  (0.01913) 
 [ 0.59138] [ 2.35528] [-0.12452] 
    
D08 -4.972880 -3.792858  0.006494 
  (12.5502)  (11.1826)  (0.01449) 
 [-0.39624] [-0.33918] [ 0.44804] 
 R-squared 
 0.313653  0.238697  0.372873 
 Adj. R-squared  0.084871 -0.015071  0.163830 
 Sum sq. resids  97246.88  0.003748  3291.845 
 S.E. equation  68.05001  0.013360  12.52017 
 F-statistic  1.370968  0.940612  1.783718 
Note: Standard errors and t- values are in brackets.  
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To check short run causality we use Wald test. If the coefficient of D(INF(-1)), D(INF(-2)), 
D(TAX(-1)) and D(TAX(-2)) jointly influence the INT variable then we conclude that there is 
the short run causality from INF and TAX to INT. Table 9 presents Wald test result. 
According to Chi-square statistics, we cannot reject null hypothesis suggesting that all the 
coefficients are equal to zero. It means that all the lags of TAX and INF jointly cannot cause 
INT. There is no short run causality coming from INF and TAX to INT.  
 
Table 9: Diagnostic Test: Wald Test Result. 
 
 
Our model also has no heteroscedasticity and serial correlation problems shown at Appendix.    
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we tested Mankiw’s (1987) optimal seigniorage theory for Turkish Economy 
using yearly time series dataset for the period 1980-2011. This theory suggests that in the long 
run higher tax rates are associated with higher inflation rates and higher nominal interest rates.  
We use cointegration and vector error correction methods (VECM) to find long run 
relationship between variables. 
 
Econometric results of the study supports the optimal seigniorage theory suggesting in the 
long run higher tax rates are associated with higher inflation rates and higher nominal interest 
rates in Turkey. Threre is only one long run causality from inflation and tax revenue to 
nominal interest rates. Moreover, 31% of any deviation from long run equilibrium is 
smoothed in one year or in three year deviations converges to equilibrum point. Model 
suggests that one percent increase in inflation and tax revenue per GNP is associated with 2.5 
and 42.6 percent increase in the nominal interest rates respectively. 
 
Our findings are in line with study of Mankiw (1987) on American Economy. However, these 
estimation results are not consistent with the empirical study of Aslan (2003) testing optimal 
seignoraige theory for Turkish Economy. 
 
Bu there is no short run causality from inflation and tax revenue to nominal interest rates.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aslan, M. H. (2003). Türkiye’de Optimal Senyoraj Teorisi ve Kamu Finansmanı Üzerine 
Ampirik Bulgular,  Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi İİBF  Dergisi, C.V, S.l, 1123-144 
 
Bailey, M. J.(1956). Welfare cost of inflationary finance. Journal of Political Economy, 64, 
93-110.  
 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
        
F-statistic  0.182501 (4, 21)  0.9449 
Chi-square  0.730003  4  0.9476 
14 
 
Begg, D., Fischer, S. and Dornbusch, R. (1994), Economics, Fourth Edition, McGraw-Hill 
Book Company 
 
Cagan, P. (1956). “The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation”, in Friedman, M. (ed.), 
Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 25-117. 
 
Cooley, T. F.  and Hansen, G. D. (1989). The Inflation Tax in a Real Business Cycle Model,  
The American Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 4, pp. 733-74. 
 
Dickey, D. A.  Jansen, D. W. and Thornton, D. L.  (1991). “A Primer on Cointegration with 
an Application to Money and Income”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review: 58-78. 
 
Doğru, B. (2011). Para Politikası Ara Rejim Hedeflemesine Göre Türkiye Cumhuriyet 
Merkez Bankası Performans Kriterlerini Etkileyen Faktörler: 1990-2011. İstanbul Üniversitesi 
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Basılmamış Doktora Tezi. 
 
Dornbusch, R. and Fischer, S. (1987).  Macroeconomics. 4 th ed. NewYork: McGraw-Hil. 
 
Engle, R. F. and Granger, C. W. J. (1987). "Cointegration and Error Correction: 
Representation, Estimation, and Testing", Econometrica, Vol 55; 251-276. 
 
Foote, C. (2010). Money and Inflation, Lecture notes, Harvard University Department of 
Economics. 
 
Friedman, M. (1971). “Government Revenue from Inflation”, The Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol 79/4: 846-856. 
 
Fuller, W.A.(1976), Introduction to the Statistical Time Series, John Wiley, New York. 
 
Gürbüz, B. et al .(2010). Seigniorage and Public Deficit: A Test of Comparison between 
Turkey and Tunisia.  International Journal of Business and Management Vol. 4, No. 9: 55-71 
 
Güloğlu, B. and İvrendi, M. (2010). The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks on Exchange 
Rate: A Structural VECM With Long-Run Restrictions 
 
Granger, C.W.J. and Newbold, P .(1974). “Spurious Regressions in Economics”, Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol 2/2; 111-120 
 
Korap, L. (2006). Seigniorage Revenue And Turkish Economy. MPRA Paper No. 20106 
 
Klein, M. and Neumann, M. J. M., “Seigniorage: What is It -Who Gets It?” 
Welswirtschaftliches Archiv 126,  
 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). “Testing The Null Hypothesis of Stationarity Against The 
alternative of A Unit Root”, Journal Of Econometrics, 54, 159-178. 
 
Mankiw, N. G. (1987). The Optimal Collection of Seigniorage Theory and Evidence, Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 20, 327-341. 
 
15 
 
Marty, A. L.(1967). Growth and the Welfare Cost of Inflationary Finance. Journal of Political  
Economy, 75 
 
MacKinnon, James G. (1996), “Numerical Distribution Functions for Unit Root and 
Cointegration Tests”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol 11; 601-618. 
Osterwald-Lenum, M. (1992). “A Note with Quantiles of the Asymptotic Distribution of the 
Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Rank Test Statistics,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, 54, 461–472 
 
Phelps, E.S. (1973).“Inflation in the Theory of Public Finance.” Swedish Journal of 
Economics 75, 1: 67-82. 
 
Phelps, E. S. (1972). Inflation Policy and Unemployment Theory. W. W. Norton and Co., 
New York, 1972. 
 
Samimi, A., Nademi, Y. and Ghaderi, S. (2012). Inflation and Inflation Tax in Developing 
Countries; A Panel Threshold Approach. International Journal of Academic Research in 
Economics and Management Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 1 
 
Vegh, Carlos A. (1992).  Stopping High Inflation, IMF Staff Papers, Vol.39, No.3, pp.625-
695 
 
 
 
APPENDIX:  
 
Graphes of Variables in First Difference 
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Figure 1: D INF
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Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH   
     
     F-statistic 0.169003    Prob. F(2,24) 0.8455 
Obs*R-squared 0.374975    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.8290 
 
Null hypothesis: There is no ARCH effect 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.793290    Prob. F(2,19) 0.4668 
Obs*R-squared 2.234990    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.3271 
 
Null hypothesis: there is no serial correlation 
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